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INTRODUCTION
One way to frame the German idealist tradition is to place front and center the problem of
subjectivism, the view that external objects are only mental objects within the circle of
consciousness. A number of recent interpretations of Hegel have looked to his Philosophy of
Nature (PN)1— where he treats the question “What is nature?”—as offering conclusive evidence
of his naturalism, and thus as ruling out a Hegelian subjectivism.2 Terry Pinkard, for example,
has argued that “[t]he specific character” of Hegelian idealism “emerges in Hegel’s discussion of
nature” and is best understood as a “disenchanted Aristotelian naturalism” (Pinkard, 2012:19).
Accordingly, Pinkard’s reading of PN focuses on what nature must be like for “minded” animals
to develop within it and for spirit to emerge from it. Yet, defending such an interpretation is quite
difficult given Hegel’s insistence that “the emergence of spirit from nature must not be
conceived as if nature were absolutely immediate, the first” because “spirit is what is absolutely
first” (PS 381Z). Such remarks pose a formidable obstacle for interpreters who wish to ground a
less subjectivistic version of Hegel in his treatment of nature. While PN can seem to offer
resources for such a naturalism, both its content and its methodology point away from nature,
and thus away from naturalistic readings, towards the logical and metaphysical priority of spirit,
mind, or Geist, and thus in an apparently subjectivistic direction.
In this paper, I focus on two key claims in PN: first I consider Hegel’s claim that (§1)
spirit is prior to nature and second, I consider the claim that (§2) nature is the Idea in the form of
otherness. For Hegel, spirit is prior to nature because it most fully expresses the Idea, whereas

I use the Miller translation of Hegel’s Encyclopedia, but I have occasionally made my own adjustments to Miller’s
translation. For instance, I have opted to use the term “Concept,” rather than “Notion” as Miller does, in translating
“Begriff.”
2
For the view that Hegel’s philosophy moves away from subjectivism towards naturalism and realism, see Beiser
(2002), Kreines (2015), Stern (1990), Stone (2005), Ng (2020), and Pinkard (2005) (2012).
1
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nature is the Idea in the form of otherness. In the final portion of the paper, (§3) I examine the
consequences of these two key claims. I first argue that although Hegel’s philosophy should not
be considered subjectivist in a Kantian sense, there is still an important thread of subjectivism in
his treatment of nature. Hegel’s PN is subjectivist in the sense that nature is essentially—though
not fully—a subject.

3
1

THE PRIORITY OF SPIRIT OVER NATURE

Throughout his mature work, the Encyclopedia, Hegel repeatedly claims that spirit has priority
over nature, often referring to spirit as nature’s truth.3 Part of what he means by this claim is the
merely epistemological and furthermore uncontroversial thesis that nature can only be known by
spirit, and thus our knowledge of nature depends upon spirit. In making this claim, Hegel is not
far from Kant, in that both see knowledge of nature as epistemically dependent upon subjectivity.
However, Hegel goes much further than Kant in claiming that nature’s essential characteristic is
that it is “only relative,” in the sense of being “essentially related to a First” (PN 247Z). For
Hegel, spirit is not only epistemically prior to nature— because knowledge of nature requires a
knowing subject— but conceptually prior to nature— because nature without spirit would be in
an important sense incomplete.
1.1

Anthropocentricism in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature

Although Hegel enjoys expressing himself in sweeping and general terms, the principle of
spirit’s priority over nature is not left in such terms. It is rather instantiated on the ground as well,
for instance in Hegel’s account of animals. Here his anthropocentrism—and thus the priority he
accords to spirit as human mindedness– is on full display, as when he explicitly says that the
animal in general, including higher-order non-human animals, can only be understood with
reference to “the perfect animal” —the human (PN 370Z). To be clear, this anthropocentricism is
not merely a claim about the biological constitution of some species of mammals, humans, being

PN 251, “Spirit […] is the truth and final goal of Nature, and the genuine actuality of the Idea.” See also PN 376Z,
“Spirit […] is prior to it [Nature], Nature has proceeded from spirit[…] in such a manner that spirit is already from
the very first implicitly present in Nature.” See also, PS 381, “Spirit is the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely
primary with respect to it.” PS 388, “Spirit has come into being as the truth of nature. […] this result has the
meaning of the truth and of what is prior[…]” See also PN 248A, “Nature appears as First[…]” only to sensory
consciousness. Hegel also makes clear that nature qua nature is not to be “divinized,” and that any product of Spirit
(“mental image, the slightest fancy of mind, the ply of its most capricious whims”) is a far superior basis for
knowledge of God.
3
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the most complex or fully developed. The natural features of the human species—such as its
hands—do figure into such a narrative, especially in his Anthropology; however, what makes the
human the highest animal is not some natural feature but its spirituality, for what makes those
features salient in the first place for Hegel is that they are the expression and actualization of
spirit (PN 370Z, PS 411, 411A, 411Z). Thus, the point is that Hegel’s anthropocentricism
regarding animal lifeforms is a direct consequence of the priority he accords spirit.
Now, Hegel’s anthropocentricism is not a mere epistemic thesis that the concept of the
perfect animal serves as a heuristic principle for how we must understand animal lifeforms
regardless of what they actually are. He is not claiming that we impose a hierarchical conceptual
order upon nature, ranking humans above other forms of natural life, because we can only know
nature as if it were a Scala Naturae.4 For one, were Hegel’s anthropocentricism is strictly
epistemic, he would be guilty of the same version of subjectivism he so ardently criticized in
Kant.5 The version of subjectivism Hegel found so problematic in Kant was a skeptical one that
viewed conceptual determinations of objects as being merely subjective and as not pertaining to
things themselves.6 For the purpose of focusing on Hegel, I will bracket the question of whether
Hegel’s interpretation is an adequate interpretation of Kant. Let’s characterize this version of
subjectivism as follows:
Skeptical subjectivism (S): Human knowledge is only of appearances; we do not have
knowledge of objects as they are in themselves apart from our forms of intuition.
4

Terry Pinkard, for instance, sometimes seems to endorse such an epistemic view when he speaks of the conceptual
requirements that we have in order to think of nature coherently, even though nature itself is (or might be) otherwise.
According to Pinkard, “[Hegel’s PN] expresses the necessary classifications involved in the Idea of nature” but these
are only classifications “for us (for Geist)” (Pinkard, 2002: 272).
5
See Hegel’s remarks that teleology in Kant “[…] only serves as a maxim for our limited human understanding […]
This human perspective is not supposed to affirm anything concerning the reality of nature. The perspective remains
wholly subjective” (D 163).
6
See, for example, Hegel’s extensive discussion on the Kantian philosophy at the beginning of the Encyclopedia,
“[E]ven Kantian objectivity of thinking itself is in turn only subjective insofar as thoughts, despite being universal
and necessary determinations are, according to Kant, merely our thoughts and distinguished from what the thing is
in itself by an unsurmountable gulf” (L 41Z).

5
It’s worth noting that according to S there may be mind-independent objects; however, if there
are, then we simply can have no knowledge of them. As it pertains to the knowledge of animal
lifeforms, Hegel clearly rejects S and endorses a much stronger ontological thesis that the highest
animal presents us with the “standard” through which we can know non-human animals to be
constitutively “undeveloped” (PN 352Z, 370Z). That is, the conceptual determinations identified
in the perfect animal are not imposed upon nonhuman animals—which may for all we know be
otherwise. Rather, the conceptual determinations given in the perfect animal articulate the
essence of all animal lifeforms. As Hegel says, “[t]here is only one animal type and all varieties
are merely modifications of it” (PN 370Z). Hegel goes so far as to say that if the variety of
animal lifeforms do not align with “the general determinations” given in the perfect animal
“which must be made the rule[,]” then – contra empirical, inductivist method – “it is not the rule
[…] which is to be altered, as if this had to conform to these existences, but conversely, it is the
latter [the existent animal lifeform] which ought to conform to the rule; and insofar as this actual
existence does not do so, the defect belongs to it” (PN 370Z). Insofar as animal lifeforms fail to
exhibit those determinations given in the concept of the perfect animal, these lifeforms are
imperfect.
Despite Hegel’s outright rejection of S, there is nevertheless a clear dimension of
subjectivism in his treatment of animal lifeforms, albeit of a different type.7 To understand what
distinguishes a Hegelian subjectivism from the epistemic counterpart, we need to have a better

We can see further examples of Hegel’s rejection of subjectivist skepticism in his criticisms of empiricism in the
introductory Zusatze. “Now although the empirical treatment of Nature has this category of universality in common
with the Philosophy of Nature, the empiricists are sometimes uncertain whether this universal is subjective or
objective; one can often hear it said that these classes and orders are only made as aids to cognition.” Hegel claims
that the conceptual determination of natural objects—natural laws, forces, genera, or species— are not “subjective
additions” imposed from without by us; rather, “they are the objects’ own inner essence; the orders not only serve to
give us a general view, but from a graduated scale of Nature itself.” (PN 246Z)
7
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understanding of what kind of priority spirit has over nature—the character of which becomes
evident in Hegel’s methodological approach to nature.
1.2

The Conceptualizing Approach to Nature

Hegel gives an indication of the kind of priority spirit has over nature at the beginning of PN
when he addresses the goal of PN. Although PN does aim to answer the question “what is
nature?,” Hegel never characterizes the goal of PN as a mere knowledge of nature. Rather, the
goal of a philosophy of nature is “that spirit find in nature its own essence” (PN 246Z, 251).8 The
point is that spirit’s essence is subjectivity, and it is in this sense that Hegel’s Naturphilosophie is
subjectivist.
For Hegel, an answer to the question “what is nature?” must involve accounting for what
nature must be like in order to be intelligible in the first place; an answer to that question is to be
found, as he says, only in “reference to the knowledge of nature” (PN Introduction Z). The core
of the argument is that any coherent account of what nature is ontologically (e.g., it is atoms and
void, monads, substance, will, etcetera) simultaneously demands a solution to the
epistemological problem of how knowing it to be such is possible, and this methodological
criterion shows that the conception of nature as a realm of objectivity devoid of subjectivity— a
position common to many physicalist naturalists— is a nonstarter for the understanding of
nature.9 It is not just that subjectivity is an epistemic requirement for knowledge of nature, and
hence, any picture of the natural world cannot coherently eliminate subjectivity while also

8

Hegel does not restrict this aim to Naturphilosophie alone. Hegel believes that all knowledge is directed at the
recognition of spirit. “All activity of the mind is, therefore, only an apprehension of itself, and the aim of all genuine
science is just this, that mind shall recognize itself in everything in heaven and on earth. There is simply no out-andout Other for the mind” (PS 377Z).
9
Typically, Hegel’s Phenomenology is thought to be the work where he most systematically addresses the question
of knowledge; however, the entire introductory Zusatze to PN focuses on the metaphysical question “What is
Nature?” and he claims that we can only provide an answer to this question by transcending the “one-sidedness of
the theoretical and practical approaches to nature” in a conceptual treatment of nature.

7
claiming to know it; for Hegel, this epistemic requirement has ontological significance. Hegel’s
claim is that in knowing nature at all, we must know nature to be implicitly a subject and to
exemplify types of subjectivity. In Hegel’s words, we must “find in this externality only the
mirror of ourselves” (PN 376Z). Only an approach that recognizes “Nature as free in her own
peculiar vital activity”—as being a kind of subject— can know nature. Such an approach sees
nature as exemplifying a hierarchy of subjectivity culminating in spirit (PN 245Z). Hegel calls
this approach a “conceptualizing approach” to nature (PN 246).
Hegel arrives at the “conceptualizing approach” by showing that the two approaches we
ordinarily adopt towards nature—practical and theoretical approaches— fail to answer the
question “what is nature?” We can only answer this question if we integrate the practical and
theoretical into a unified approach to nature. The practical approach— as when we utilize nature
for our own purposes by, e.g., building homes from natural materials or by reshaping an
environment for better farming— treats nature merely as a means to satisfy this or that end, and
in so doing, understands nature to be exhausted by our own ends (PN 245). In the theoretical
approach— as when we attempt to step back, as we do in natural science, to understand nature as
something independent of us— we are directed at knowing nature, but this approach fails to
adequately grasp nature independent of the subject (PN 246). The theoretical approach, Hegel
argues, is “self-contradictory” because simply by thinking of nature we transform it from what it
is, an immediate existent object, into something it is not, a thought or a universal concept—
“natural objects do not think, and are not presentations or thoughts” (PN 246Z).10
“[T]he theoretical approach is self-contradictory, for it seems to bring about the direct opposite of what it intends;
for we want to know the Nature that really is, not something that is not. But instead of leaving Nature as it is, and
taking it as it is in truth, instead of simply perceiving it, we make it into something quite different. In thinking
things, we transform them into something universal; but things are singular and the Lion as Such does not exist. We
give them the form of something subjective, of something produced by us and belonging to us, and belonging to us
in our specifically human character: for natural objects do not think, and are not presentations or thoughts” (PN
246Z).
10
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Hence, both approaches are incapable of telling us what nature is because they each fail to
demonstrate that they stand in any relation to an independent nature. Hegel goes so far as to say
they fail to show that they are approaches to nature at all: the practical approach treats nature and
natural things as “nothing in themselves[,]” only a means for our purposes; and the theoretical
approach cannot explain how the concepts, by which it understands nature, pertain to nature and
are not merely subjective concepts in us (PN 246Z). Although these approaches fail
independently, they each offer elements which are requisite for the knowledge of nature.
Starting from a fundamental gap between spirit and nature, subject and object, as the
theoretical approach does, is a dead end; instead, we need to start from their unity. However, to
unify the two in a distinct third thing—like an independent Platonic form in which both spirit and
nature participate— would only raise the question of how the third thing relates to both spirit and
nature. Rather, nature and spirit must be unified within one of these terms. Yet, if we accept the
epistemic requirement (that subjectivity is required for knowledge), then nature cannot be devoid
of subjectivity while also being known to be so. Nature, taken as wholly non-subjective, cannot
be the basis for understanding nature; such a nature has no awareness of itself and cannot tell us
what it is. Thus, nature alone cannot account for how nature is knowable at all. Hegel’s point is
that there is a clear asymmetry between nature and spirit: spirit can be the basis for the
understanding of nature and spirit, whereas nature cannot. Hence, self-knowing spirit is prior to
nature, and it is only in and through spirit that the unity of nature and spirit can be known.11

11

Hegel makes a very similar argument when he speaks of the weakness of materialist philosophies in the
Anthropology: “[T]he standpoint of separation is not to be regarded as final, as absolutely true. On the contrary, the
separation of the material and the immaterial can be explained only on the basis of the original unity of both. […]
this unity must not be taken as something neutral in which two extremes of equal significance and independence
come together, since the material has no meaning at all beyond that of a negative over against spirit and over against
itself” (PS 389Z).

9
“[T]he healing of this breach [between nature and spirit]” must be found in spirit, “the solution
must be sought in consciousness itself” (PN 246Z).12
What we need, Hegel argues, is an approach that unites spirit and nature, an approach that
can account for its own relation to nature—whether the relation is one of grasping nature in
thought or acting within nature. The comprehending approach—what Hegel also calls the “true
teleological method”—integrates moments of the practical and theoretical approaches to nature
into a totality; it sees purposes or ends (practical moment) as inhering immanently in nature’s
own structure (theoretical moment). In short, it recognizes nature as being self-determining in its
own way and in doing so it sees spirit everywhere “implicit in nature” (PN 376Z). Only an
approach that accounts for the unity of nature and spirit by seeing nature as exhibiting
subjectivity at various levels of its existence could coherently answer the question “what is
nature?”13 What Hegel means to show us by bringing together the practical and theoretical
approaches to nature is that we can only truly grasp nature if we see it as being, to some degree, a
subject capable of grasping its own ends. In other words, nature aims at subjectivity. However,
although nature is permeated by subjectivity—and so there are ‘ends’ immanent in the natural
world for Hegel—subjectivity is only truly brought to fruition in spirit. Spirit is nature’s “truth
and final goal” (PN 251). Thus, nature without spirit is incomplete. It is in this sense that spirit is
prior to nature.

Christian Martin’s (2021) recent essay, “Three Attitudes Towards Nature,” is helpful here. Martin shows that
Hegel’s PN articulates a philosophical orientation towards nature capable of conceiving of it as a unity, an
orientation which empirical sciences are unable to give. However, Martin’s emphasis that the unity of nature is an
aesthetic, felt unity directly contradicts Hegel’s claims that the sought for unity takes place in the cognition the
comprehends, that is, in spirit (Martin, 2021: 9-11). In making the unity of nature an aesthetic, felt unity rather than
a unity in cognition, Martin’s interpretation more closely resembles Goethe’s or Schelling’s philosophy of nature,
which Hegel derides as being “naïve” (PN 246Z). For Hegel, the unity must not be an immediate one in feeling, but
a resultant unity in cognition.
13
Joshua Wretzel’s (2021) recent essay, “Hegel’s Critique of Materialism” clearly articulates a related point
concerning Hegel’s conception of immaterialism: “[T]here is simply no way to understand the fit between mind and
nature without also fundamentally changing the way we understand nature” (Wretzel, 2021: 161).
12
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2

NATURE IS THE IDEA IN THE FORM OF OTHERNESS

Although Hegel recognizes nature as exemplifying a variety of subjectivity, it is only in spirit
that subjectivity is fully expressed. In what follows, I hope to show that the priority accorded to
spirit in Hegel’s philosophy is due to its being the fullest manifestation of the Idea. Once we
understand the specific way that nature is the Idea, we can appreciate the centrality and
importance Hegel accords to spirit, and consequently, shed light on the subjectivist dimension in
his treatment of nature.
The Idea is the central point around which Hegel’s system moves, and it is his preferred
term for the unity of concept and reality.14 Each sphere within the Encyclopedia—Logic, PN, and
PS— exhibits a different relation between the concept and its reality. Hegel describes the Idea at
the beginning of the Encyclopedia as “the true in and for itself, the absolute unity of the concept
and objectivity” (L 213). Yet, part of the challenge of understanding the status of nature in
Hegel’s system involves determining what Hegel means by calling nature the “Idea in the form
of otherness.”
2.1

The Impotence of Nature

For Hegel, nature has a paradoxical character. On the one hand, he claims that nature is in itself
the Idea (PN 248A). In saying so, Hegel means that nature has an intelligible structure due to the
concept being immanent within it. Hegel even goes so far as to say that “the being of Nature is
essentially ideality” which is to say that nature is essentially intelligible (PN 247Z). Yet, on the
other hand, Hegel also claims that the Idea as it is in and for itself, as the perfect conformity of
concept and reality, is ultimately “not present in nature”—and only first appears in spirit.15 Hegel

The term “Concept” or Begriff in Hegel, translated as “Notion” by Miller, is contentious, but it is generally agreed
upon that Begriff designates the conceptual or intelligible structure that constitutes an object.
15
See, PN 247Z, “Since Nature is the Idea in the form of otherness, the Idea, conformable to its Concept, is not
present in Nature as it is in and for itself, although nevertheless, Nature is one of the ways in which the Idea
14
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is adamant in the introduction to PN that nature in its immediate existence fails to accord with its
own conceptual structure perfectly. He calls this inability of nature to exemplify its own
conceptual structure the “impotence” of nature, and it is because of this impotence, Hegel says,
that natural entities are vulnerable to deformity, are not easily classifiable empirically, and are “a
prey to boundless and unchecked contingency” (PN 248A). However, these two
characterizations of nature—as both “impotent” and in itself the Idea— are in tension with one
another. Insofar as nature is the Idea—and the Idea is the unity of concept and reality— nature is
essentially, even if only implicitly, that same unity. Yet, insofar as nature is impotent, it is
incapable of explicitly presenting such a unity. Hence, Hegel refers to nature as the
“contradiction of the Idea” and the “unresolved contradiction” (PN 248A, 250).
The contradiction manifests an apparent tension in Hegel’s approach to nature. As Hegel
claims, “The contradiction of the Idea, […] is more precisely this: that on the one hand there is
the necessity of its [Nature’s] forms which is generated by the Concept, and their rational
determination in the organic totality; while on the other hand, there is their indifferent
contingency and indeterminable irregularity” (PN 250). The tension stems from Hegel’s
commitment to both the intelligibility of nature, which Hegel attributes to the presence of the
concept immanent in nature, and his commitment to that same nature being unable to make its
existence conform to its conceptual structure explicit, which Hegel believes explains the
difficulty, even the “impossibility,” of finding fixed natural kinds based on an empirical
treatment of nature16. That nature is intelligible at all is due to the concept being immanent in
manifests itself, and is a necessary mode of the Idea.” See, also, PN 374 “Natural existence as such does not itself
contain this universality [of the concept] and is not therefore the reality which corresponds to it [the concept]” and
PN376Z “The living being is, it is true, the supreme mode of the Concept’s existence in Nature; but here, too, the
Concept is present only in principle.”
16
See, for example, “This is the impotence of Nature, that it preserves the determinations of the concept only
abstractly, and leaves their detailed specification to external determination” (PN 250). See also, “Undoubtedly,
traces of the determination by the Concept are to be found even in the most particularized object, although these

12
nature, but that natural things are not exhausted by their conceptual determinations is due to
nature’s being impotent.
Now, despite the insistence that nature is the “unresolved contradiction,” nature’s most
essential aspect is to be found in its concept. Hegel’s emphasis on this conceptual dimension of
nature—and so on nature’s being implicitly the Idea—is clearly visible in the way Hegel resolves
the earlier opposition in our ordinary approaches to nature by proposing a synthesis of theoretical
and practical approaches to nature, what he calls a comprehending or conceptualizing approach.
According to such an approach, the “universal aspect of things,” arrived at through thinking, is
what constitutes the essence of natural things (PN 246Z). As Hegel says, “Not until one does
violence to Proteus—that is not until one turns one’s back on the sensuous appearance of
Nature—is he compelled to speak truth[,]” and even “Philosophical, true idealism consists in
nothing else but laying down that the truth about things is that as such immediately single, i.e.
sensuous things, they are only a show, an appearance” (PN 246Z). In short, nature is not
independent of the Idea for Hegel. Nature is the Idea, yet qua nature, it exists in “the form of
otherness”—as not fully expressing the unity of concept and reality.17 “[O]nly in spirit,” Hegel
says, “does absolute unity of concept and reality occur” (PS 386).
2.2

Spirit is the Truth of Nature

Although nature and spirit are both modes of the Idea, the major difference between the two is
that spirit fully expresses the Idea by exhibiting an identity of concept and reality. At times,

traces do not exhaust its nature. Traces of this influence of the Concept and of this inner coherence of natural objects
will often surprise the investigator, but especially will they seem startling, or rather incredible, to those who are
accustomed to see only contingency in natural, as in human, history. One must, however, be careful to avoid taking
such a trace of the Concept for the total determination of the object” (250R).
17
“Since Nature is the Idea in the form of otherness, the Idea, conformable to its Notion, is not present in Nature as
it is in and for itself [i.e., as it is in Spirit], although nevertheless, Nature is one of the ways in which the Idea
manifests itself, and is a necessary mode of the Idea” (PN 247Z).

13
Hegel even equates spirit with the Idea, saying that “spirit is the infinite Idea” and spirit is the
“genuine actuality of the Idea” (PN 251, PS 386).18 Nature, on the other hand, does not explicitly
present the Idea as it is in itself; nature presents the Idea in the form of otherness—a form whose
existent reality fails to match up with its concept. At the beginning of the Philosophy of Spirit,
Hegel calls spirit “the truth of nature” because spirit—by presenting the Idea— presents nature’s
own essence (PS 381).
Hegel also characterizes spirit as the “self-knowing Idea” and as the “simple selfrelation” (PS 381Z, 382). Cutting across all these characterizations is a certain way of framing
the concept/reality distinction. What Hegel means in saying that spirit is the identity of concept
and reality is that spirit can grasp itself in thought and that in doing so spirit is what it is. That is,
something is spirit by virtue its self-knowing. Spirit, for Hegel, is not some discrete entity19—as
it was for Descartes, a thinking substance, — but is essentially characterized by its own active
self-reference. What characterizes spirit is not only that it bears a certain structure (i.e., the unity
of its concept and its reality) but that its structure shows how spirit’s self-knowledge must be
isomorphic with its actualization— “in self-knowing spirit the product is one and the same as that
which produces it” (PS 379Z). In Hegel’s words, “Spirit is essentially only what it knows itself
to be” (PS 385Z). All of which is to say, that the development of a self-understanding of spirit
would at the same time be an expression of spirit.
Although nature does achieve varying degrees of subjectivity, and thus varying degrees
of self-knowledge, natural entities do not make themselves into what they are by knowing

In PN 258A, he states, “[T]he True […] the Idea, Spirit, is eternal.” He also, at other times, contrasts the Idea with
nature in, for example, PN 248Z, “Nature is the negative because it is the negative of the Idea. This existence
[immediate natural existence], however, is only momentary, not a true existence; the Idea alone exists eternally[.]”
19
“Spirit is not an inert entity but is rather what is absolutely restless, pure activity […] not an essence that is
already complete before its appearing, keeping to itself behind the mountain of appearances, but truly actual only
through the determinate forms of its self-revelation” (PS 378Z).
18
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themselves to be such.20 Hence, Hegel everywhere refers to nature as “unmindful of itself,”
“estranged from itself,” and “external to itself” (PN 247, 247Z).21 It is otherwise in spirit. The
kind of self-knowing in spirit achieves an isomorphism between the concept of spirit and its
actuality. In short, knowing itself to be a certain way can constitute what spirit is (or makes of
itself).

20

For example, the animal organism, by pursuing other members of its species with which to reproduce, displays a
degree of self-awareness concerning its own participation in a genus; it “recognizes” its own genus as being in
another member of the species.
21
Nature’s inability to know itself in a fully robust way is also a reason why nature cannot serve as the basis for the
unity of nature and spirit.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATUS OF NATURE IN THE SYSTEM

Up to now, I’ve argued that Hegel accepts (§1) spirit is conceptually prior to nature due to the
very fact that (§2) nature fails to fully express the Idea. Thus, nature is not self-sufficient. In the
remainder, I wish to flesh out some of the consequences that I believe follow from my
interpretation.
If Hegel is subjectivist in any sense, it is not because he believes that human knowledge
of nature stops short of knowing what nature really is (as S above did). Hegel has already
criticized the one-sidedness of the theoretical approach to nature, which treats it as an alien other,
and claimed that the original identity of subject and object in “the cognition which comprehends”
does not merely grasp nature for us but gets at the essence of things.22 Nevertheless, he must be
considered subjectivist in another sense because he accepts the thesis that nature itself is, to some
degree, a subject, or displays varying degrees of subjectivity and self-determination. We can
distinguish this form of subjectivism as follows:
Natural Subjectivism: Nature consists in a variety of subjectivity that form a hierarchy
from lowest-levels to the highest-levels of subjectivity.
The key to this version of subjectivism is that subjectivity culminates in spirit. For Hegel, we can
make sense of nature’s subjectivity only if we recognize spirit as the completion of nature’s goal.
It is in this sense that nature without spirit would be incomplete. Formulated in this way, we
might be tempted to say that Hegel does not believe that the natural world is mind-dependent at
all, rather it is merely mind-like or spirit-like.23 However, there is a further sense in which Hegel
is a subjectivist that follows from spirit’s being the fullest expression of the Idea.

See, for example, “This universal aspect of things is not something subjective, belonging to us: rather is it, in
contrast to the transient phenomenon, the noumenon, the true, objective actual nature of things themselves” (PN
246Z).
23
Inwood (1992: 129) also claims that Hegel’s idealism is, at least in part, the thesis that the world is “mind-like.”
22
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In the Science of Logic, Hegel claims that things are actual only to the extent that they
exhibit the Idea. He states, “[T]he idea is the unity of the concept and objectivity, the true, we
must not regard it as just a goal which is to be approximated but itself remains always a kind of
beyond; we must rather regard everything as being actual only to the extent that it has the idea in
it and expresses it.” (SL 12.174). What follows from these claims is that nature, to the extent that
it does not achieve full subjectivity, should not be considered actual. The affirmative element in
nature is the manifestation of the concept in it, but the concept is only brought to full expression
in the realm of spirit.
Hegelian subjectivism: Everything is actual to the extent that it expresses the Idea, and
the Idea is fully expressed in spirit.
Because nature qua nature is only the “self-degradation” of the Idea, it is relegated to a lower
status in terms of its actuality (PN 248R). Thus, Hegel calls nature “derivative,” “untrue,” “the
negative,” and even “non-being” (PN 248R, 376Z, PS 388). Such a status can be seen if one
recognizes the internal linear progression happening within Hegel’s PN, a progression that
moves from the most “self-external” dimensions of nature—and so least subjective—, such as
the spheres of mechanical physics and chemistry, to the most self-internalized and subjective
dimensions of nature, such as it occurs in organic life. Yet, even the highest sphere of nature, that
of non-human animal life, fails to adequately unite its concept with its own reality. Hence, PN’s
linear progression tracks with nature’s attempt to express its subjectivity and make manifest the
Idea, but this progression exemplifies a goal that is only achieved in spirit which actualizes the
Idea.
It is this sense of subjectivism that is the most controversial in Hegel interpretation. It is a
version of subjectivism that has commonalities with traditional metaphysical interpretations of
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Hegel.24 According to these traditional readings, the subject plays an ontological role in bringing
the object into being. Further research into the subjectivistic character of Hegel’s philosophy
ought to clearly distinguish Hegel’s use of the terms actuality from existence (or existent natural
things). Hegel frequently refers to finite natural things as having existence, though he does not
accord them actuality. A fuller treatment of this distinction might temper Hegel’s seemingly
bombastic claims. Nevertheless, I have tried to show throughout this paper that while we would
be wrong to construe the natural world in Hegel’s view as merely the objects of finite
consciousness, we cannot neglect the centrality that subjectivity plays in constituting the natural
world for Hegel.

24

As found in Beiser (2005), Solomon (1987), and Taylor (1975).
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CONCLUSION

In my paper, I have argued that Hegel’s PN should be understood considering two key aspects
that suggest there is a subjectivist dimension to the work: the priority of spirit over nature and the
fact that nature’s otherness is relative to the Idea. Although Hegel outrightly rejects the Kantian
variety of skeptical subjectivism, there is nevertheless a form of Hegelian subjectivism in his
treatment of nature. Namely, nature itself exhibits an array of subjectivity, and that the natural
world is in a variety of ways self-determining. Although nature for Hegel is not merely a mental
object of some finite consciousness, Hegel is committed to the view that nature is the result of
subjective activity.
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